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Some Weak Points in the Model
Penal Code
By ROLLN M. PERKINs*
THE Model Penal Code, prepared by the American Law Institute,
represents such an outstanding achievement that there is understand-
able hesitation in suggesting lack of perfection at any point. If, how-
ever, those who think improvements are possible do not hesitate to
make suggestions, and the points thus raised are adequately discussed
pro and con, the result cannot be harmful.
The Dearth of Definition
One disturbing aspect of the Code is the dearth of true definitions
in Part II, "Definitions of Specific Crimes." For the most part the of-
fenses are indicated rather than defined. A true definition is made up
of three parts: (1) the term, (2) the genus and (3) the differentia.
The term is the subject of the definition-the word or phrase to be
defined; genus is a category of classification, a class or group ranking
beneath a family and above a species; differentia is the attribute or
characteristic by which one species of a genus is distinguished from
every other. In other words a true definition must give (1) the word
or phrase to be defined (the term), (2) the placement of this thing
in a group of like things (the genus) and (3) the peculiarity which
distinguishes this particular thing from other like things (the differ-
entia).
For example, crime is any social harm defined and made punish-
able by law. Crime is the term; social harm is the genus, the kind of
thing crime is; and the requirement that it be defined and made
punishable by law distinguishes it from every other kind of social
harm. Parking overtime in a restricted zone may be defined and made
punishable by law, but it is not social harm. It belongs in a different
genus-social inconvenience-and hence is not a crime. On the other
hand, cheating by means of a false promise is social harm, but in
most jurisdictions today it is not made punishable by law and hence
(in such jurisdictions) is also not a crime. It belongs to the genus but
is excluded by the differentia.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
The Official Draft of the Model Penal Code is unavailable. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all references are to the Proposed Final Draft (1962).
One who undertakes to define, without having given careful
thought to the true purpose of a definition, will often start in terms
of "when" or "where" or "what." "Murder is when ..." nor "Murder
is where .. ." for example, although neither time nor place represents
any genus of which murder is a species. A true definition of common-
law murder must be in some such form as this: "Murder is homicide
committed with malice aforethought." The genus is homicide, the kind
of thing murder is, and the requirement that it be committed with
malice aforethought distinguishes it from every other kind of
homicide.
A small boy asked to define a screwdriver came up with this sug-
gestion: "A screwdriver is what drives screws." This may convince
us that he could recognize one on sight but it is quite unsatisfactory
as a definition. It neither tells us what kind of thing a screwdriver is
nor offers anything in the nature of differentia. Had he said, "A screw-
driver is a tool for driving and withdrawing screws by turning them,"
we would have had a true definition. It is not intended by this illus-
tration to indicate that it represents the type of definition employed
in the Code, for much in the way of differentiae will be found there,
although the genus is seldom named. A definition of a screwdriver, fol-
lowing the general plan of the Code would be as follows: "A person
is using a screwdriver if he drives or withdraws a screw by turning it."
True definitions are employed for the offenses at the start of Part
II of the Code. Thus murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide
are all assigned to the sub-genus "criminal homicide," each with its
appropriate differentia. This would be excellent if criminal homicide
were defined in the Code as homicide committed without justification
or excuse-which would seem to be the proper definition. Section
210.1, however, is worded: "(1) A person is guilty of criminal homi-
cide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the
death of another human being. (2) Criminal homicide is murder,
manslaughter or negligent homicide."
Under earlier provisions of the Code (Articles 2-4) homicide may
be justifiable or excusable although committed purposely or know-
ingly (under specified circumstances) with the result that we shall
have justifiable and excusable murder. At common law homicide may
be justifiable or excusable but there is no such common-law concept
as justifiable or excusable murder-and there should not be. It is to
be hoped that any state adopting the Code will redefine this section
as follows:
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Section 210.1 Homicide.
(1) Homicide is the killing of one human being by another.
(2) Criminal homicide is homicide committed without justifi-
cation or excuse.
(3) The grade of criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter
or negligent homicide.
Except at the very start of Part II, the specific crimes are pre-
sented by the Code without resort to the true-definition technique.
It should be emphasized, however, that while crime is any social harm
defined and made punishable by law, a true definition, while desirable,
is not indispensable. If a crime is indicated with such precision that
those who would be law-abiding will have no doubt what must be
avoided, and those accused will know exactly what type of misconduct
has been charged against them, it can be said, loosely, to be defined.
There are disturbing indications, however, that the dearth of true defi-
nitions resulted from a desire to allow the courts a certain amount
of leeway to develop each crime on a case by case basis.1
The Use of Deadly Force
The privilege of using deadly force had its common-law develop-
ment primarily in the areas of law enforcement and crime prevention,
and the extent of the development is not surprising since all felonies
were punishable by death in the early days. As the felon had forfeited
his life by the perpetration of his crime, it was quite logical to author-
ize the use of deadly force if this reasonably seemed necessary to
1
'Tm afraid that it is precisely the sort of thing which we consciously delegated
to the decision of the courts." 35 ALI Pnocunnmcs 343 (1958). "We are leaving to
judicial determination whether the requirement of strong corroboration is to be viewed
as an element of the crime. I would say that on the draft as it stands there is so much
deliberate ambiguity on this point, at least it was deliberate on my part anyhow."
37 ALI PnocEEDiNGs 142 (1960). "Just trust the judges. Obviously a term like 'legiti-
mate purpose' is an invitation to judicial development." 38 ALI PRocEDuiNos 225
(1961). "Yes, we undertook to consider the scope of animals, and wondered whether
insects and worms, and so on, should be covered, and we finally decided that that was
an issue we would trust to the court under the general zoological consideration of
'animal."' 39 ALI PRocE iNcs 219 (1962). "We didn't wish to define the absolute scope
of this." Id. at 154. "No, there is no definition. We tried one . . . and this is one of
those calculated ambiguities. This would have to be worked out through continuing
litigation of this subject." Id. at 215. "There will be room, of course, for interpretation
of the breadth of meaning carried by the word 'situation,' precisely the room needed
in our view." MODEL PENAL CODE at 48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). "The Draft does
not attempt to solve the problem by explicit formulation but here, as in the Section on
complicity . . . we believe that it affords sufficient flexibility for satisfactory decision
as such cases may arise." MODEL PENAL CODE at 113 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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bring him to justice. And since the officer had a duty to arrest for
felony he could not be required to act at his peril on the question of
actual guilt. If he had authority to make an arrest for a felony he
was authorized to use deadly force if to do so reasonably seemed
necessary to effect it.
Another consequence of the extreme penalty for felony was that
deadly force was privileged if this reasonably seemed necessary to
prevent its perpetration. Anyone was authorized to use deadly force,
for example, if this reasonably seemed necesary to prevent rape, and
obviously a woman could not be required to do less if she herself was
the intended victim. Anyone who was himself free from fault was
privileged to use deadly force if this reasonably seemed necessary
to prevent the murder of an innocent victim-including himself. The
English judges, it should be emphasized, regarded any such use of
force as within the privilege of crime prevention. Only confusion re-
sults from the mistaken notion, sometimes entertained, that the start-
ing point was the privilege of self-defense, to which other privileges
were added later.
Self-defense was a secondary and imperfect privilege developed
by the judges to give some protection to the person who was too
much at fault to be entitled to the privilege of crime prevention. The
typical illustration is the case of the man who had provoked, or will-'
ingly entered into, an unlawful, nondeadly scuffle with an adversary
who suddenly and unexpectedly seized a weapon with intent to kill.
The ove first mentioned had forfeited his privilege of crime preven-
tion, which would have permitted him to stand his ground and use
whatever force reasonably seemed necessary to prevent the threatened
felony. But his fault was so far exceeded by the greater fault of the
other that the secondary privilege was recognized for his protection-
the privilege of self-defense. This required him to retreat, if a safe
retreat was available, and if he killed the other as a last resort, when
his back was "at the wall," this homicide was in the ancient days not
justifiable but only excusable. He was not entitled to an acquittal but
was recommended for a pardon. As a pardon seems never to have
been denied in such a case, it came to be issued "as a matter of course"
without referring the matter to the king. And still later, one who met
the strict requirements of self-defense was entitled to a verdict of
not guilty.
Some of the courts in this country misunderstood the English cases
on self-defense and thought they applied to the innocent victim of
a murderous attack. The result is the so-called "retreat rule" juris-
[Vol. 17
dictions in which no one is privileged to resist an attack with deadly
force if an obviously safe retreat is available unless there is some
exceptional situation such as the victim's being within his "castle" at
the time. Except for this modification, which developed in some juris-
dictions by accident, and the general limitation of the use of deadly
force in crime prevention to the so-called dangerous felonies such as
murder, robbery, burglary, arson, rape and mayhem, the privilege of
using deadly force today is governed by the harsh rules of a primitive
society in which capital punishment was deemed appropriate for
every felony.
This would be drastically changed by the adoption of the Code in
which the primary emphasis is upon self-defense, so far as the privi-
lege of using deadly force is concerned. Thus the innocent victim of
a murderous assault would have no privilege of crime prevention but
only the privilege of self-defense which, as therein formulated, follows
in general the position taken in the "retreat rule" jurisdictions. And
to prevent the commission or consummation of such felonies as arson,
burglary or robbery, the use of deadly force would be privileged only
if the actor believes that the wrongdoer "(1) has employed or threat-
ened deadly force against or in the presence of the actor; or (2) the
use of force other than deadly force to prevent the commission or
consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his
presence to substantial danger of serious bodily harm."2
Suppose an armed bank messenger, carrying 25,000 dollars from
the bank to a nearby establishment, is approached by thugs who de-
mand that he hand over the briefcase containing the money. On his
refusal they say they intend to take the briefcase by force, but they
are unarmed and assure him that he will not be harmed in any way.
He realizes that he cannot protect the money with his own physical
strength alone, but also that by reason of their superior strength and
numbers they will be able to take it without injury to him. Is he privi-
leged to shoot if this reasonably seems necessary to prevent being
robbed? The answer of the common law is "yes," because the privilege
of crime prevention authorizes the use of deadly force if this reason-
ably seems necessary to prevent a so-called "dangerous felony," such
as robbery. The answer of the Code would be "no," because he would
be privileged to use deadly force only in self-defense and he is not
in personal danger.
The privilege of using deadly force needs to be seriously curtailed,
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii).
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but the Code goes too far. The bank messenger should be privileged
to prevent that robbery.
Criminal Attempt
The Code provides: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
the commission of the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct
which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were
as he believes them to be; or. ... "3
This would permit conviction of an attempt to commit a crime
although its perpetration was legally impossible, which seems unsound.
Something has to be said about legal impossibility because the phrase
has resulted in extreme confusion. If it is said, for example, that it is
legally impossible to receive stolen property if no property has been
stolen, this may be supported, in a sense, but such an approach pre-
vents any meaningful distinction between legal and factual impossi-
bility. It is comparable, in reverse so to speak, to classifying the erro-
neous notion that deadly force is privileged, if this reasonably seems
necessary to prevent larceny, as a mistake of fact-since as a matter
of fact the law is otherwise. On such a basis every mistake could be
reduced to a mistake of fact. e
The use of the phrase "legal impossibility" should be restricted
to those situations in which the impossibility results from the criminal
incapacity of the actor. Under the common law of England a boy
under the age of fourteen was legally incapable of committing rape
and since the crime was legally impossible, his effort to have such
forcible intercourse did not constitute an attempt to commit rape.
Under the common law a partner is legally incapable of committing
larceny from his own firm, and hence his effort to appropriate such
property does not (where the rule remains unchanged) constitute an
attempt to commit larceny. And if under the law of a particular juris-
diction a holdup by a juvenile does not constitute robbery, but an
entirely different kind of misconduct known as "juvenile delin-
queincy,"' such an effort by him (whether successful or otherwise)
should not be held to be attempted robbery.
The wording of the Code would cause no difficulty in ordinary
situations such as these because the attendant circumstances are ex-
actly as the actor believes them to be-but it could happen otherwise.
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1).
4People v. Roper, 259 N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932).
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In the type of jurisdiction mentioned a juvenile, because of a mistaken
notion as to the date of his birth, might believe his age to be such
that he was no longer within that favored category. Although a holdup
by him would be robbery if the attendant circumstances were as he
believes them to be, the legal impossibility should prevent it from
being recognized as attempted robbery.5 The Code should take the
position that there is no criminal attempt if perpetration is legally
impossible, with the explanation that, as used, the term applies only
to situations in which the impossibility results from the criminal in-
capacity of the actor.
The grading of criminal attempt also seems open to question.
Except for a capital offense or a felony of the first degree 6 the punish-
ment for a criminal attempt under the Code would be the same as
that provided for the completed offense itself.7 It should be men-
tioned in this connection that much which is classified as mere prepa-
ration under existing law would be sufficient for an attempt under
the Code. Thus one might be held to have committed attempted bur-
glary although he had gone no farther than to "case the joint," to
use the underworld expression. Many ad hoc statutes have been mov-
ing in this direction, such as acts providing penalties for possessing
burglar's tools with intent to commit burglary, mingling poison with
food with intent to kill or injure, assembling combustibles with intent
to burn the property of another, and so forth.
The Code approaches criminal attempt from the standpoint of res
ipsa loquitur-in its literal sense: "the thing itself speaks." What would
constitute mere preparation under the common law would be sufficient
for a criminal attempt under the Code if, but only if, the circumstances
are "strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."8 This is
quite an improvement-apart from the problem of gradation, but it
seems excessive to provide the same penalty for the possession of
burglar's tools under circumstances strongly corroborative of the
actor's criminal purpose as for the actual perpetration of burglary.
The Code wisely provides that one who has gone far enough to incur
guilt of criminal attempt may purge himself of the crime by a timely,
complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.' No
5 To take the position that the age of the actor is not an "attendant circumstance"
would open up endless disputes as to what is included within the phrase.
6 A felony of the first degree is one punishable by a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06.
7MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1).
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2).
9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4).
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doubt many a man who has possessed burglar's tools under circum-
stances strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose has, when the
time approached, completely and voluntarily abandoned the intended
burglary. Under the Code, if such a one who would not have carried
out his original burglarious intent is arrested before he has manifested
a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose, he is
subject to the same punishment as if he had actually committed bur-
glary. On the other hand, if a gangster in carrying out an intent to
murder shoots at, but misses, his intended victim the punishment is
much milder, under the Code, than if he had successfully completed
his intended crime.10 Although it may be doubted whether the same
penalty should be provided for an attempt as for the completed of-
fense, there is at least much more reason for applying it in the latter
case than in the former.
Criminal Negligence
The concept of criminal negligence made its first appearance in
the law of manslaughter. In the development of the homicide cases
the early judges tended to concentrate on the extremes: (1) Was the
killing with malice aforethought and hence murder, and if not, (2)
was it under such circumstances of justification or excuse as to con-
stitute innocent homicide? Thus manslaughter developed as a catch-
all concept-in one sense a negative concept: it was homicide which
was neither murder nor innocent. At the start of this development it
seems that no homicide was deemed excusable if it resulted from neg-
ligence, but eventually the courts came to recognize "a marked dis-
tinction between simple or ordinary negligence, giving one a right
of action for damages, and culpable negligence, rendering one guilty
of a criminal offense."'"
There has been some tendency, under certain statutes, to hold
ordinary negligence sufficient for criminal guilt, but in general more
is required. Negligence may be "advertent" or "inadvertent," depend-
ing upon whether the actor is or is not aware of the unreasonable
risk he is creating, and one possible solution would have been to hold
the former sufficient for criminal guilt and the latter insufficient. This
would have been unsatisfactory, however, since either type of negli-
gence may be slight or it may be extreme. The position taken by the
common law is that either type of negligence may be sufficient to
1 OMODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.05(1), 6.06.
" State v. Baublits, 324 Mo. 1199, 1211, 27 S.W.2d 16, 21 (1930).
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establish criminal guilt if, but only if, it represents conduct which
falls far short of the standard of care required by law-that of a
reasonable man under like circumstances. Needless to say this applies
only to a crime, such as manslaughter, which does not require some
other type of culpability such as intent or knowledge. To represent
the greater type of fault required for conviction various adjectives
have been employed, such as that the negligence must be "gross,"
"culpable" or "criminal."
To establish criminal guilt on a negligence basis the Code requires
conduct which "involves a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation."12
If such a deviation is advertent it would, under the Code, constitute
a greater degree of culpability-recklessness (done "recklessly").
Thus homicide resulting from such an advertent deviation would
constitute manslaughter whereas if the deviation had been inadver-
tent it would have created the lesser offense of negligent homicide.'3
This represents a marked improvement over existing law and the only
objection is to the terminology-the Code would substitute the word
"negligence" for the phrase "criminal negligence." It is true that con-
sidering only the Code it is a little simpler to speak of one who has
acted "negligently" rather than "with criminal negligence," but if the
Code is adopted it will not be alone but will be part of the general
'body of law of the jurisdiction. The result will be to give the word
"negligente" one meaning in criminal law and an entirely different
meaning in the law of torts-a type of linguistic confusion far from
unique in the law but not to be deliberately encouraged. It is to be
hoped that in legislation this concept will be expressed in terms of
"criminal negligence."
Malice
The Code does not use the word "malice," which is regrettable
because this represents a very useful concept despite some unfortu-
nate language employed at times in the effort to express it. Thus the
recurring phrase "abandoned and malignant heart"'14 seems more sug-
gestive of cardiac tumor than a state of mind. In the homicide cases,
moreover, there has been distortion by certain additions such as the
felony-murder rule, which additions are quite foreign to the concept
12 MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(d).
I8 MOEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3, 210.4.
14 Malice is "the dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart." 4 B.Acn-
sToNE, CoiENwAumEs *198. The term has found its way into statutes. See, e.g., CAL.
PEN. CODE § 188.
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itself. Basically malice, as a legal concept, is made up of two com-
ponents, one positive and the other negative. On the positive side
malice requires an intent to cause particular harm (such as to take
human life, if the crime is murder; to burn another's dwelling, if the
crime is arson; to publish defamation of another, if the crime is libel),
or an intent to act with wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious
likelihood of causing such harm. On the negative side it requires the
absence of any circumstance of justification, excuse or recognized
mitigation.
We shall have some rather astounding concepts under the Code,
such as "justifiable criminal mischief." It provides that a person is
guilty of criminal mischief if he "damages tangible property of another
purposely" 5 although this might be done justifiably as, for example,
under the judgment or order of a competent court.' 6 Had the offense
been worded in terms of malicious mischief any damage to the prop-
erty of another under circumstances of justification or excuse would
have been excluded by definition.
Absolute Liability
Deeply ingrained in human nature is the tendency to distinguish
intended results from accidental happenings. This is the everyday
experience of the man on the street. One who has been greatly bene-
fited by the act of another may be very much pleased in any event,
but his feeling toward the other will not be the same if it was quite
an accidental result as it would be if it was the very purpose intended.
And one who has been painfully injured by another's act will not have
the same personal resentment if it was obviously accidental as he
will if the harm was inflicted upon him intentionally. "I didn't mean
to" is an explanation so frequently accepted that it is often one of
the early acquisitions of small children. In the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes, "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and
being kicked."17 Thus pure conjecture might lead to the conclusion
that the ancient criminal law held a man answerable only for his
intentional misdeeds, and that punishability for certain unintended
results came as a later development, but all the evidence points the
other way. "Law in its earliest days tries to make men answer for all
the ills of an obvious kind that their deeds bring upon their fellows." 18
15MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(a).
1 6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.03(1)(c).17 HOLMES, THE CoMMoN LAW 3 (1881).
18 2 POLLOCx & MAIrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 470 (2d ed. 1899).
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"Tunishment in those days apparently did not hang upon proof of any
guilty state of mind."19
The emergence and gradual development of the mens-rea concept
have been detailed elsewhere 0 and need not be repeated here. The
result was the position, firmly established, that there is no criminal
guilt without fault.21 This was extended, moreover, to those offenses
which are not true crimes, originally referred to as offenses mala pro-
hibita, and more recently as public welfare offenses or civil offenses.22
As to these, however, there was a resurgence of strict liability, start-
ing over a hundred years ago,23 and carried to unreasonable lengths.
A butcher was convicted of selling unsound meat although he was
unaware of the unsoundness and could not have discovered it by any
examination which he could have been expected to make.24 By rail
a seller shipped pure milk which was adulterated in transit by some
unknown person. Starting with the premise that title did not pass
until receipt by the consignee, the court held that the seller had com-
mitted the offense of selling adulterated milk although he "was entirelyinnocent morally, and had no means of protecting himself from the
adulteration of this milk in the course of transit .... 25 The height of
extremity was reached in the case which held: "It is no defense to
a prosecution for driving an overloaded truck in violation of the
Vehicle Code that defendant had first obtained a weight certificate
from a licensed weightmaster which indicated that the truck was not
overloaded."26
19 Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARvAuD
LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 401 (1934).
20 2 POLLocx & MArrLAND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 470-71, 479-80, 490-91, 499;
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974 (1932).2 1 "Contrary to general belief there are no common law offenses in which mens rea
is not required, notwithstanding an insignificantly small number of badly reasoned cases
to the contrary." Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1101
(1958).2 2 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L. REv. 55 (1933). In certain
rural areas, for the protection of the farming interest, statutes were enacted forbidding
the selling or serving of oleomargarine which was not plainly marked as such so it
could be rejected by all who wanted butter. See Welch v. State, 145 Wis. 86, 129
N.W. 656 (1911). As the only feasible means of enforcement, penalties were pro-
vided for the violation of such statutes. Down through the ages the violation of such
a penalty clause has been recognized as something other than a true crime.
23"The new movement in England dates from the case of Regina v. Woodrow
[15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 9071, decided in 1846 ... . Sayre, The Present
Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARvAaR LEGAL EssAYs 399, 407
(1934).24 Hobbs v. Winchester Corp. [1910] 2 K.B. 471.
25Parker' v. Adler, [18991 1 Q.B. 20, 25 (1898).
26 Commonwealth v. Olshefski, 64 Pa. D. & C. 343 (Montour County Ct. 1948).
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Fortunately the peak of this resurgence of strict liability has now
been passed and the tendency is to return to a more reasonable basis
of enforcement.27 A civil offense does not have the normal mens-rea
requirement but this means only that it does not require the same
degree of fault as is needed for conviction of a true crime. Ordinary
negligence is sufficient for conviction and many of the regulatory
statutes to which penalty clauses are attached require a very high
degree of care-so that anything less is negligence. But if the pro-
hibited result was brought about inadvertently, proof that this hap-
pened despite the exercise of a high degree of care to prevent it should
be recognized as an excuse.
During the resurgence of strict enforcement, the courts tended to
go to extremes but in modem times we have had no offense enforce-
able on the basis of absolute liability.2 8 Minor traffic violations might
be suggested for such a position, but it is submitted that if gangsters,
fleeing from the scene of their robbery, should "commandeer" a car
stopped for a red light and force the driver, under threat of death at
pistol-point, to proceed without waiting for the signal to change and
at a speed in excess of that permitted by law, this compulsion would
be recognized as an excuse.29 "[Piresumably no court would convict
a psychotic person.., of any offense."80 To the extent that the ancient
doctrine of marital coercion survives, a wife who acts under the com-
mand of her husband has an excuse.8' And the least astute officer on
any force would not think of "booking" a two-year-old for "jay-
walking."32
This is comparable to the case in which the vendor's precaution of having a sample
of feeding meal analyzed did not protect him from conviction when it was shown that
the product did not measure up to what was certified in the analyst's report. Laird v.
Dobell, [1906] 1 K.B. 131 (1905).2 7 Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 IowA L. REv. 325,
346-51 (1964).28
'Indeed, there is no such thing as a 'strict liability offense except in terms of
a partial rather than a complete discarding of mens rea ...." Packer, Mens Rea and
the Supreme Court, TE Surmm COURT REvIEw 107, 140 (1962). "Liability, then,
we suggest, was never absolute. 'Strict liability' seems to be a better term." Winfield,
The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REv. 37, 46, 51 (1926).
29See Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 140, 142, 138 S.W. 399, 400 (1911). A
farmer who shot a house pigeon feeding upon his land in order to protect his crop
was not guilty of violating the statute which provided a penalty for the killing of
such a bird. Taylor v. Newman, 4 B. & S. 89, 122 Eng. Rep. 393 (1863).8 HALL, GENERAL PRmiCImLEs OF CRnvqnAL LAw 342 (2d ed. 1960). Accord,
Mueller, How to Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern Legislators
and Traflic Courts, 60 CoLurt. L. REv. 944, 958 (1960).
aS People v. Statley, 91 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 943, 206 P.2d 76 (App. Pep't Super.
Ct. Los Angeles 1949); Commonwealth v. Daley, 148 Mass. 11, 18 N.E. 579 (1888).
82A conviction of a twelve year old girl for having made a prohibited sale of
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The Code, unfortunately, undertakes to introduce the concept of
absolute liability. Section 2.05(1) reads:
The requirements of culpability prescribed by Sections 2.01 and 2.02
do not apply to:
(a) offenses which constitute violations, unless the requirement
involved is included in the definition of the offense or the Court
determines that its application is consistent with effective enforce-
ment of the law defining the offense; or
(b) offenses defined by statutes other than the Code, insofar as
a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses
or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.33
Under this provision and an appropriately-worded drug 'act, as
pointed out by the author elsewhere, 4 a pharmacist who handed a
narcotic to one not entitled to receive it could be convicted though
he had acted unwillingly under fear of death at pistol-point. We have
no such liability at present and should not have. If it be argued that
the section quoted is subject to qualification by other sections which
provide an excuse in cases of compulsion, insanity or infancy, the
answer is that if the liability is qualified it is not absolute and should
have no such label. If the provision is held actually to mean absolute
liability it should, and no doubt would, be held unconstitutional if
adopted, but we should not ask the legislature to adopt what the
court should hold to be invalid. In addition, the resurgence of strict
liability has passed its peak, and the trend is to require that guilt of
even a civil offense (or "violation" to use the Code's term) must be
based upon some degree of fault even if it is only the failure to exer-
cise an exceedingly high degree of care. Proposed legislation should
promote this very wholesome trend rather than frustrate it and it is
to be hoped that the label "strict liability" will be substituted with
the appropriate explanation.
liquor was reversed because it was not shown that she had the necessary capacity.
Commonwealth v. Mead, 92 Mass. 398 (1865). Professor Sayre thinks the defense
of infancy should not be recognized in such a case but does not question its availa-
bility in favor of a child under seven. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLum. L.
REv. 55, 76 (1933).
3sReferences to "absolute liability" appear also in subdivision 2 of this section
and in sections 2.03(4) and 2.07(2).
N4 PEmNs, supra note 27, at 388.
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